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Since the Waldheim election and the almost simultaneous appearance of Jorg
Haider, recent history is a permanent guest at the center of politics.1
observation, registered by Marianne Enigl and Herbert Lackner,
points to an incontestable and compelling feature of contemporary
THIS
Austrian political culture: during the 1980s and 1990s, the first meaningful steps toward an Austrian Vergangenheitsbewaltigungdeveloped out of a dis?
cussion of Austrians, military service during the Nazi era and its highly problematic association with wartime atrocities and genocide. Exploration of this
theme had been avoided throughout the period of the Second
Republic by a carefully cultivated expression of public memory. The inherent
tension between the internationally sanctioned notion of Austrian victimization
during the Nazi years and the pride of many Austrian veterans in having performed their soldierly duties (Wehrpflichterflillung) had been a taboo subject.
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Waldheim's successful 1986 presidential campaign, however, reduced the psy?
Austrians to
encouraged?many
chological barriers that had enabled?indeed,
Third
and had
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own
the
under
reflections
Reich,
experiences
upon
repress
largely checked the extent to which the period was subject to critical scrutiny.2
This articledeveloped from a paperpresentedat the TwentiethAnnualConferenceof the German
StudiesAssociation Seatde, 10-13 October 1996. I would like to thank Oliver Rathkolb,Anton
Pelinka,and Giinter Bischof for their comments and suggestions.Thanks are also due to Pamela
Mason for her criticalreadingof an earlierdraft.
1. MarianneEnigJ and Herbert Lackner,"Die verschiitteteGeschichte,"Prqfil6 (3 February
1996): 21. All translationsare mine, unlessotherwisenoted.
2. Among the importantcontributionsto a reexaminationof this repressedpast are Gerhard
Botz, "Osterreichund die NS-Vergangenheit:Verdrangung,
Pflichterfiillung,Geschichtsklitterung"
ed. Dan Dincr,
und Historikerstreit,
Geschichte?Zu Historisierung
in Ist der Nationalsozialismus
(Frankfurt am Main, 1987), 141-52; Siegfried Matd and Karl Stuhlpfarrer,"Abwehr und
in Osterreich
1938-1945, ed.
Inszenierungim Labyrinthder Zweiten Republik" in NS-Herrschqft
Emmerich Talos, Ernst Hanisch, and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), 601-24; Richard
CentralEuropean
History,vol. 30, no. 4, 513-544
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The difficulties in managing historical memory are evident in the challenging conundrum stemming from Waldheim's military service?or, for that mat?
ter, that of any Austrian veteran: how could one take pride in having "done one's
duty" in the uniform of the Wehrmacht or SS, yet lay claim to victimization at
the hands of the Nazi regime? In Waldheim's case this issue was approached, ini?
tially, in the most reticent fashion; once broached, it led to bitter debate. Jorg
Haider's statements and symbolic actions, on the other hand, have represented a
righteous, defiant proscription of the prevailing, tacit consensus of fifty years that
this past was to be minimized, if not ignored outright. Several months before the
Waldheim Affair focused closer attention on Austria's past, Haider, a member of
the first postwar generation and then-emerging
leader of the right-wing
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Austrian Freedom Party; hereafter FPO),
praised former SS members at a veterans, reunion in late 1985, telling them that
their sacrifices had saved the Heimat and Western Europe from bolshevism.3
Only ten years later, prior to the December 1995 Austrian federal elections,
footage of yet another (and clearly not infrequent) Haider appearance before a
Waffen SS reunion was broadcast on German television. On this occasion he
lauded the veterans as decent men of unimpeachable moral character.
The Waldheim controversy and Haider s carefully chosen, impolitic remarks
frame the central theme to be explored in this essay?namely, the place of martial values in a fragile and in some respects ambivalent construction of Austrian
identity during the initial postwar years. The Allies' determination not to issue
a pronouncement
of collective guilt for waging a war of aggression or crimes
against humanity, coupled with a then-widely accepted representation of the
Wehrmacht as a politically neutral, professional military force, spared most sol?
diers from prosecution, and many other Austrians the need for uncomfortable
introspection.4 Austrian veterans and civilians were protected by the Moscow
Declaration (1943), reiterated at Yalta two years later, that Austria had been the
first victim of German aggression.5
The Waldheim
Phenomenon
in Austria(Boulder,1992);
Mitten, The Politicsof Antisemitic
Prejudice:
MeinradZiegler andWaltraudKannonicr-Finster,
Osterreichs
Geddchtnis:
UberErinnemundVergessen
derNS-Vergangenheit
um
(Vienna,1993);GerhardBotz and GeraldSprengnagel,eds., Kontroversen
Osterreichs
Waldheimund die Historiker
Osterreich-Identitat,
Zeitgeschichte:
Verdrdngte
Vergangenheit,
(Frankfurtam Main, 1994).
3. Brigitte Bailer-Galanda,Haiderwortlich(Vienna, 1995), 102; cited originally in Kartner
13 October4985.
Nachrichten,
4. For a surveyof the integrationof the FirstRepublics Bundesheerinto the Wehrmachtand
Austrianparticipationin the ThirdReich's armedforces,seeWalterManoschekand Hans Safrian,
"Osterreicherin derWehrmacht,"
331-60. The essayfocuseson the
inTalos, et al., NS-Herrschqft,
war in the Balkantheater.
5. Developed originallyas a psychologicalweaponby Britishofficialsand supportedby their
American counterparts to exploit "anti-Prussian"sentiment within Austria, the Moscow
Dcclaration,Robert Keyserlingkexplains,"cameto be considereda gaugeof Alliedwartimeinten?
tions"?particularlywith the emergenceof the Cold War?concerning the restorationof Austria
and was integratedinto the legal-politicalbasis of the Second AustrianRepublic."Keyserlingk,
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The notion of Austrian victimization enshrined in the Moscow Declaration,
linked with the Allied rejection of a collective guilt clause for Austria, has been
apdy referred to as the "Magna Carta of the Second Republic"6 and as the
source of the Austrian Lebensluge?i.e., that of collective victimization rather
than many troubling instances of individual complicity.7 Moreover, it became
the basis for a national myth; as Robert Knight points out, it legitimized the
myth of victimization.8 This formalized expression of public memory, reiterated in 1955 in the State Treaty that ended the occupation of Austria, confirmed
the sense of disillusionment which a great many Austrians felt by war's end, and
served as a kind of collective exoneration for the years 1938-1945. For the vast
majority of former soldiers in particular, the Moscow Declaration facilitated the
separation of Nazi-era military service from its association with genocidal con?
flict.9 Moreover, the Opferthese, with its function as an agent for memory repres?
sion10 came to represent a direct, embarrassing challenge to one of the central
questions for postwar identity formation: what role, if any, might martial values
play if an inchoate

sense of Osterreichertum was to be founded

upon principles

Austriain WorldWarII:An Anglo-American
Dilemma(Kingston,Ontario, 1988), 4. See also Giinter
Bischof, "Die Instrumentalisierungder Moskauer Erklarung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,"
20 (1993): 345-66. Bischof s essay is both a thoughtful discussionof how Austrian
Zeitgeschichte
politiciansexploited the notion of victimization,particularlyduringthe 1940s and 1950s,and a fine
historiographicalcontribution.
6. ThomasAlbrich,"'Esgibt keinejiidische Frage':ZurAufrechtcrhaltung
des osterrcichischen
Mythos,"in Der Umgangmit dem Holocaust:
Europa?USA?Israel, ed., Rolf Steininger (Vienna,
1994), 147f.
7. See Anton Pelinka and ErikaWeinzierl,eds., Das grosseTabu:Osterreichs
Umgangmit seiner
(Vienna,1987),as well as GerhardBotz,"Geschichteund kollektivesGedachtnisin der
Vergangenheit
Zweiten Republik:'Opferthese/'Lebensluge'
und Geschichtstabuin der Zeitgeschichtsschrcibung"
im erstenJahrzehntderZweitenRepublik,ed.WolfgangKos and Georg
in Inventur45/55: Osterreich
Rigele (Vienna, 1996), 51-85. To placeAustriancircumstancesregardingthe delicate,yet highlyin a
charged matters of denazification,dealing with collaborators,and Vergangenheitsbewaltigung
broaderEuropeancontext, see Dieter Stiefel,Entnazifizierung
in Osterreich
(Vienna,1981);Sebastian
Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley, and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., Verdrangte
Schuld, verfehlteSuhne:
in Osterreich
undVerstorung:
Entnazifizierung
(BadVoslau,1986);HeidemarieUhl, ZwischenVersbhnung
Eine Kontroverse
um Osterreichs
historische
Identitat
fiinfzigJahrenachdem"Anschluss"
(Vienna.1992);
Klaus-DietmarHenke and Hans Woller, eds., PolitischeSauberungin Europa:Die Abrechnung
mit
Faschismusund KoUaboration
nachdemZweitenWeltkrieg
(Munich, 1991); Henry Russo, The Vxchy
Syndrome:
HistoryandMemoryin Francesince1944 (Cambridge,MA, 1991).
8. Robert Graham Knight, "Besiegt oder befreit? Eine volkerrechdiche Frage historisch
Nation:Osterreich
unddieAllierten,1945-1949, ed. GiinterBischof
betrachtet,"in Die bevormundete
andJosef Lcidenfiost(Innsbruck,1988), 77.
9. The notion of the Austriansoldier-as-victimwas underscoredin the firstparliamentary
ses?
sion of the Second Republic."Those who had alwayscondemned this [NationalSocialist]regime
and the war,"declaredChancellorLeopold FigJ (OVP), "now return with the stigma of having
fought for this regime.We know thatduringthe wareach of the Allied powershad alreadymade the
distinctionbetween these victimsof terrorand those who stood behindthem,in orderto drivethem
to the front."Figls speech met with wildly enthusiasticresponsefrom Volkspartei,
Socialist,and
Communist delegates,while the high commandersof the four occupationforceslooked benignly
from the loges upon the assembly.Sten.Prot.NR,V.G.P.,2nd Session,21 December 1945,19.
10. On the repressionof memory,see Ziegler and Kannonier-Finster,Osterreichs
Gedachtnis.
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between peoples, and perma?

nent neutrality?
in
State Identity
Problematizing
Austrian
Political
Culture
Contemporary
Well into the mid-1980s, the peculiar dynamic of postwar Austrian political cul?
ture had encouraged the sublimation, if not outright repression, of the inherendy inconsistent soldier/victim dualism as politically expedient. Political cul?
ture, as I employ the concept here, refers to the "grammar" of public discourse,
in which the range of the permissible and the taboo is structured according to
specific rules, whether openly articulated or tacidy acknowledged. These rules
may evolve as conditions change.11 Political culture in the Second Republic, I
argue, was and still is shaped primarily by three clusters of factors. First, Austria's
people, not unlike other Europeans, exhausted by interwar civil conflict and
several years of war-induced misery, were convinced that economic prosperity,
welfare, and social peace would check the appeal of left or right-wing extremism after 1945. Consequendy, they embraced cooperative, consensual strategies
for the resolution of pressing social, economic, and political problems associated with reconstruction and recovery. In the Austrian case, however, there was
also a widespread recognition that consensus-based solutions would minimize
intrusions by Allied occupation authorities into domestic affairs. Second, along
with most Central and Eastern European peoples, Austrians experienced a series
of rapid transformations of political regimes between 1918 and 1945?includ?
of monarchy, a short-lived republic, an indigenous
ing some combination
authoritarian government, National Socialist dictatorship, and occupation. The
stability essential to the success of the Austrian Second Republic was contingent not only upon popular acceptance of, but also continued support for, stable democratic institutions and a distincdy Austrian identity, the latter founded
on the principle of victimization. This necessitated the population s willingness
to accept new forms of civic education and the development of a state con?
sciousness based in part upon the selective appropriation of time-honored
Habsburg and First Republic symbols, and, more significandy, the creation of
viable new symbols and practices capable of nurturing and sustaining a fragile
and as yet uncertain new identity. To a significant extent, the elements of this
revised sense of Osterreichertum developed in response to external factors?the
complex

and somewhat

contradictory

nature of the Allied occupation

on the

11. This notion is adaptedfrom CliffordGeertz'sassertionthatan interpretivetheory of culture
hasthe twofold taskof disccrning"theconceptualstructuresthatinformour subjects'acts,the 'said'
of social discourse,and to constructa systemof analysisin whose terms what is generic to those
structures,what belongs to them becausethey are what they are,will standout againstthe other
of Cultures,
determinantsof humanbehavior."Geertz,TheInterpretation
(New York,1973),27.
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one hand, and the popular desire of most Austrians to distance themselves from
than
the trappings of a greater German Volksgemeinschqft, on the other?rather
ftom a militandy self-conscious,
widespread Austrian particularism that had
been violendy suppressed by the Nazi regime.12 Third, as intimated in the
quotation, an unspoken agreement not to address past conflict
Enigl/Lackner
(the resentments and anger stemming from the civil war atmosphere of
1918-1934; the Catholic conservative Austrofascist regime of 1934-1938; and
the generally passive acceptance of the National Socialist dictatorship, or
of active complicity in its repressive and genocidal measures) effectively precluded genuinely critical attempts to come to terms with it.To accept
this distancing of society from the past was to preserve the Austrian Lebensluge
against critical revisionists.
instances

The social democratic parliamentarian Peter Kostelka remarked recendy
that "Austria's political culture distinguishes itself through an inability to
engage in conflict."13 Taking the point a step further, I suggest that postwar,
Austrian political culture has promoted the displacement
of the essential content of debate over Austrian identity into the cultural realm.
More specifically, formal institutions such as governmental coalitions forged by
the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs (Austrian Socialist Party; hereafter SPO)
consensus-oriented

and Catholic-conservative
Osterreichische
(Austrian
Volkspartei
and 1986-present), and the
Party; hereafter OVP) camps (1945-1966
"social partnership" of SPO labor and OVP business and agricultural
created parameters within which social conflict can
(1945-present)

Peoples
informal
interests

be manthe sorts of bitter conflict over justice in the workplace and
aged?preempting
constitutional issues that had debilitated the interwar republic. Contestation of
incipient identity in the Second Republic, then, was sublimated into areas in
which successful negotiation was far from a foregone conclusion?i.e.,
into the
venues of cultural and social reproduction. One finds it manifested at a num?
ber of sites: the choice/interpretation
of classic German dramatic and musical
works at the Viennese Burgtheater,Volkstheater,
or the various Festwochen; lobminoribying for the protection of cultural autonomy for German-speaking
ties in South Tyrol; the content of historical education for primary and see12. Vto-Anschluss
sentimenthad existedsince the end of the monarchy,however,and in the case
of the German National camp from as early as the late nineteenth century.On Anschlussthought
prior to the Nazi takeover see Helmut Konrad, ed., Sozialdemokratieund "Anschluss":
HistorischeWUrzeln
desAnschlusses1918 und 1938 (Vienna, 1978) and StanleySuval, TheAnschluss
Questionin the WeimarEra:A Studyof Nationalismin GermanyandAustria,1918-1932 (Baltimore,
1974).
13. PeterKostelka"Schulterschluss
189 (June1996):lO.This point
uncrwunscht,"WienerJournal
was made in conjunction with an evaluation of Austro-Germanrelations in the mid-1990s.
Although he was at least as concernedwith the pervasiyeproblempf contemporaryAustrian-style
parliamentarygridlock as with skirting around the morassof highly-chargcdhistoricalmemory,
Kostelkas comment corroboratesthe notion that petty disputeshave become a substitutefor substantivedebate over issueswhich might compel one to discussissuesrelatedto a volatile past.
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ondary school students; the role of the Roman Catholic Church in religious
and public education, and its influence upon abortion legislation. These exam?
ples, case studies into the nexus between the realms of politics and culture in
their own right, suggest the engagement of a variety of institutions with the
politics of identity.
This essay takes into consideration a rather different locus in the politics of
of Austrian Second World War veterans and
Austrian identity formation?that
their ambiguous notion of community during the 1950s. I do not contend,
thereby, that the potential for a revived militarism or German-national senti?
ment has been deeply rooted or widespread in the Second Republic. Rather, I
argue that the Soldatenverbande and Soldatentreffen (veterans' associations and veterans'reunions, respectively) represented an embarrasment and grounds for con?
cern for those officials determined to nurture an embryonic, still-indeterminate
sense of Austrianness in the 1950s. With each ritual celebration of camaraderie,
participants in veterans' organizations sought to reestablish an exclusive sense of
Gemeinschaft that reaffirmed their identity as former soldiers of the Third Reich.
In the process, Kameradschaftsbiindlercreated a troublesome victim/perpetrator
dualism for those entrusted with building a credible post-Nazi Austrian com?
munity.
A comprehensive

history of Austrian veterans has yet to be written. This
study seeks to consolidate and advance the small body of literature on veterans'
activities, and to explore the contradiction they posed to the fundamental leitmotif of Austrian political culture: the official myth of victimhood. Thus, I am
at least as interested in official Austrian reaction to veterans' activities, as it
worked to contain them, as I am in the veterans' associations themselves.
Included here is a discussion of the Fronterlebnis in World War I and theoretical
between 1914 and
reflections upon its significance for community-building
1918, as well as upon the sanctification of this experience during the Third
Reich. The body of the essay is an exploration of the enduring importance of
the Frontgemexnschaftfor organized, right-wing veterans after 1945 and efforts by
Austrian authorities and particularly the Austrian Left to check their influence.
Contemporary historians should take note that archival source material that had
been generated by Kameradschaftsbunde themselves is likely to remain frustratingly incomplete. During the 1950s, veterans associations expressed their views
far more frequendy through ritual practice than in written form. Newspaper
editorials represented the principal exception which survives into the present;
veterans' associations newsletters and magazines from the period were subject to
strict censorship by Austrian and Allied Control Commission authorities. The
most consistent and informative primary sources for Kameradschaftsbund selfexpression come from two sources: first, Interior Ministry reports on the con?
stitution of groups and the nature of their activities forwarded to Vienna by
provincial police officials; and second, the statements of right-wing (and even
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public

on Comradeship
Wars

the Two World

of the dead
of veterans' associations and the commemoration
The phenomenon
after the Second World War, particularly with respect to Austria, have only just
begun to attract scholarly attention.15 A considerably larger body of historical
scholarship has concerned itself with the cultural history of the First World War
experience, and this literature raises questions and themes which can inform
reflection upon veterans after 1945.16 Among the latter, Eric Leed's now-classic
work, informed by Victor Turner's theory of symbols and social structure, offers
a most compelling point of departure for the study of the soldier's experience
as a complex of rituals involving separation, liminality, and aggregation. This
approach is particularly instructive when brought to bear upon the ambiguous
of World War II service on the part of Austrian
Kameradschaftsbunde and its relationship to post-1945 identity formation.
Modris Eksteins has argued with respect to the First World War that the indissoluble connection which men forged in combat
nature of commemoration

. . . was . . . not all that resilient outside of the batde zone when men were
forced to confront the complexities of the "real" world. The intensity of feel?
ing and companionship belonged to a similar time and place. That explains
why some soldiers were keen to get back to the trenches, from leave and from
rest quarters.17
14. The lattersourceis a particularlyinformativeone. FPO parliamentary
(a great
representatives
number of them had been Nazis, and were denied their political liberty until 1949), as officials
freely-electcd by a decriminalized constituency, sought to impart an air of legitimacy to
Kameradschaftsbund
membershipthat conflictedwith the governingparties'attemptsto sweep them
the USSR and France)find groundsto reexunderthe rug?lcst the occupationforces(particularly
amine the vaUdityof the AustrianOpferthese.
15. For the Austrian case see Reinhold Gartnerand Sieglinde Rosenberger,Kriegerdenkmdler
(Innsbruck,1991); Stefan Riesenfellner and Heidemarie Uhl, eds., Todeszeichen:
Zeitgeschichtliche
Denkmalkultur
vomEndedes 19.Jahrhunderts
in Graz undin derSteiermark
biszur Gegenwart
(Vienna,
Zur Denkmalkulturund Geschichtspolitikder
1994);HeidemarieUhl,"ErinnerungalsVersohnung:
Zweiten Republik," Zeitgeschichte
23 (1996): 146-60. A more comprehensiveEuropean study is
Wars(Oxford,1990).On the pol?
George L. Mosse,FallenSoldiers:
ReshapingtheMemoryofthe World
itics of veterans'associationsas interestgroup lobbieswithin the sphereof social welfarepolicy,see
GermanVeterans
aftertheSecondWorldWar(ChapelHill,
JamesM. Diehl, TheThanksofthe Fatherland:
1993).
16. See, for example,EricJ. Lced,No Man'sLand:CombatandIdentilyin WorldWarI (Cambridge,
1979); Modris Eksteins,Rites of Spring:The GreatWarand the Birthofthe ModernAge (New York,
GermanVictimsofthe GreatWar,1914-1939 (Ithaca,1984);
1989);Robert W.Whalen,BitterWounds:
GreatWarin European
CulturalHistory(Cambridge,
JayWinter,SitesofMemory,Sitesof Mourning-.The
1995).
17. Eksteins,Ritesof Spring,232.
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This sentiment, Leed suggests, was the result of habituation to aggression
through the experience of combat, a cohesion born of cohabitation of a liminal state in which customary, civilian mores were abrogated.18 The resultant
behavior was marked by "radical discontinuity on every level of consciousness,"
and characterized by actions that are taboo in a conventional social structure.
Turner's concept of liminality, situated within the framework of religious ritu?
al, focuses upon the novice's separateness from the ordinary structures of "conthe person in a liminal state, on the
ventionally" constituted society?i.e.,
threshold between two disparate realities, participates in an extra-ordinary transitional community.19 Leed argues that the soldier's experience, from his initial
military training through his life under combat conditions, is characterized by a
profound form of separation from his former, normative community, followed
by aggregation into an existential communitas in which the individual's previous
social status is transcended:
The experience of living outside of class as a declassified, or not-yet-classified, individual was productive of a sense of comradeship among those who
shared this situation. The lack of status of the frontsoldiery, like the statuslessness of a liminal group, can seem to be both a painful loss of identity and a
positive liberation from those social distinctions which customarily prevent
the formation of close personal bonds across class lines. In going to war the
soldier was stripped of the visible marks of status?clothes, address, property,
insignia of social rank?that defined his place in society. The formal equality
of the army was not, however, comradeship, as many young middle-class vol?
unteers found out. Comradeship came only after the invisible marks of sta?
education, ways of speaking and other manners?were
tus?attitudes,
erased. . .20
Such a process, then, would account for the sense of disassociation, even discomfort, that Eksteins notes many Worid War I combat troops tended to feel
during temporary (re)aggregation into conventional society on leave or on rare
visits home without having been formaUy discharged from their particular lim?
inal state?i.e., the comradeship of the front, either in the east or the west. In
Germany and to some extent in Austria as well, the solidarity of this "commu?
nity on the threshold" between life and death found expression in the
Frontkdmpfer tradition, in the Kampfgemeinschqft of those who had been through

18. Lced, No Man'sUnd, 3,8ff.
19. Turner,TheRitualProcess:
Structure
andAnti-Structure
(Ithaca,1991 [originally1969]),94-103
and 127-40, particularly132. Withinthis liminal,or transitionalphase,the fellowshipof neophytes
resultsin the creation of a special,temporarycommunity at the marginsof normativesociety,
Actionin
referredto by Turneras existential
idem,Dramas,Fields,andMetaphors:
communitas;
Symbolic
HumanSociety(Ithaca,1994 [originally1974]), 169.
20. Leed, No Man'sLand,25.
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destructive power of

and Frontgemeinschaft

In the particular case ofWorld War II, the formation of a front-soldier identity
was linked to the heroically-depicted
myth ofthe Fronteriebnis of 1914-1918
cultivated by veterans, as well as to the respect for the myth inculcated in youth
during the 1930s and early 1940s. In the case ofthe armed forces themselves,
an outright emphasis upon "the myth of the so-called Frontgemeinschaft of
1914-1918," explains Omer Bartov, with "the related belief that only total spir?
itual commitment would enable one to withstand, if not actually celebrate, the
horrors of modern war.. ." linked members of the Wehrmacht to veterans of
the Great War, and contributed forcefully to a sense of soldierly community in
the Wehrmacht.22 Solidarity intrinsic to the concept of Gemeinschaft, born out
of the quasi-sacral experience of warfare as a sanctified state, would promote a
very high degree of unit cohesion in the armed forces ofthe Third Reich23 and
would foster the strong postwar ties among many veterans which translated into
the formation of veterans' associations.
In his discussion ofthe socialization of boys through the Hider Youth into
a militant "rebellious conformism," Bartov notes that their education "did not
make them all into committed

Nazis." He suggests most convincingly that this
nonetheless,
"provided them with an oudook that profoundly
upbringing,
influenced their manner of both physically and mentally coping with and
reacting to the realities of the war [. . .] whether or not they happened to be
enamored of the regime."24 Bartov's point is substantiated by work on the
Hider Youth (HJ) that has underscored the value the regime placed upon the
martial training and Nazi Staatsburgerkunde to which boys were subjected

in

21. The new experience of combatas a productof new weaponryis too largea topic to address
here, but a fine corpus of scholarlywork has been devoted to the subject.See, for example,John
in WorldWarI (Baltimore,1976);Denis Winter,Death'sMen:
Ellis, Eye-Deepin Hett.Trench
Warfare
Soldiersof the GreatWar(Harmondsworth,1979); Eksteins,Rites of Spring;Bernd Ulrich and
im ErstenWeltkrieg:
WahnundWirklichkeit
(Frankfurtam Main,
Bcnjamin Ziemann,eds., Frontatttag
1994).
22. Omer Bartov,HitlersArmy:
Soldiers,
Nazis,andWarin the ThirdReich(Oxford,1992), 60. My
45f and Stephen G. Fritz,Frontsoldaten:The
emphasis.See also Diehl, TheThanksof the Fatherland,
GermanSoldierin WorldWarII (Lexington,KY,1995), 188-90,207-8,217-18.
23. On the issue of solidaritysee also EdwardA. Shils and MorrisJanowitz,"Cohesion and
12 (1948):28O-309.This
Disintegrationin the wehrmachtin WorldWarII,"PublicOpinionQuarterly
classicessay,the best of earlywork on the source of the Wehrmacht'sinternalstrengthas well as its
limits,advancesa versionof the "rationalactor"model of individualandgroupbehavior.While per?
suasivein many respects,it fails to develop sufficiendythe importanceof the central concept of
could not haveexisted.Solidarity,I suggest,can?
comradeliness,without which the Frontgemeinschaft
not be easilyaccounted for in a rational-choiceinfluencedapproach.
24. Omer Bartov,"The Conduct of War:Soldiersand the Barbarizationof Warfare,"
Journalof
ModernHistory64 (Supplement,1992):42.
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their formal capacity as HJ members and in the course of their schooling. HJ
participation had become mandatory for all German?and
Austrian?boys
by
the time ofthe invasion of Poland in September 1939, and served, indeed, as
a viable institution through which to cultivate a Nazi interpretation of soldierly virtues. Wehrmacht and SS recruiters competed actively against one
another to attract the elite among late teenaged Hider Youth members; by
1942 Wehrertuchtigungslager der Hitlerfugend provided a forum in which boys
between sixteen and eighteen spent three weeks, under the tutelage of SS,
army, and air force trainers, engaged in intensive exercises and drills intended
to develop character, military readiness, and combat capabilities. The trainers
drew upon the boys' previous ten years' regimen of physical education as a
basis for this premilitary training.25 This emphasis upon preparing boys physically for the regime's conception of a Manichaean struggle for living space
and racial mastery was complemented,
of course, by a thorough nazification
of historical and biological education, the class barrier-breaking potential of
Labor Service, and the virtual deification of Hider as the omniscient and
omnipotent Fiihrer. All contributed to a climate in which boys were likely to
the general

features

(at the very least) of the Nazi ideal of the
Volksgemeinschaft-as-Kampfgemeinschaft once they entered the Wehrmacht or
theWaffen-SS.
accept

According to Turner, the "neophyte in liminality must be a tabula rasa [. . .]
on which is inscribed the wisdom ofthe group, in those respects that pertain to
new status."26 Given the hallowed character attributed to conflict in the service
of National

Socialism as inculcated through the teaching of history, popular
and
military training, the front line soldiers experience of combat
propaganda,
been
less
the inscription of a sacred mystery upon a naive neophyte,
have
may
and more the confirmation

of what passed for self-evident truth imparted
through earlier socialization. Because the war against the Soviet Union was east
as a racial crusade, an ideological war against an inferior, subhuman enemy
(consider the infamous "Commissar Order"), wanton or excessive violence
directed toward civilians, Soviet POWs, and particularly Jews rarely met with
punishment, and was, rather, all too frequendy encouraged.
Regardless of the symbolic capital in which the neophyte invested, whether
or not a soldier considered himself a Nazi, an inveterate nationalist, or merely a

25. See,in particular,GerhardRempel, Hitler'sChildren:The
HitlerYouthandtheSS (ChapelHill,
Die
1989), 173-204, esp. 184, and PeterD. Stachura,"DasDritte Reich und die Jugenderziehung:
Rolle der Hiderjugend1933-1939,"in Nationalsozialistische
Diktatur1933-1945: Eine Bilanz, ed.
KarlDietrich Bracher,ManfredFunkc,and Hans-AdolfJacobsen(Bonn, 1986),224-44. "To serve
a Volksgemeinschaft,
to live a life of camaraderie,
to believe in the Germanpeople and Hider as the
German Fuhrer,"explainsStephen Fritz,"these were ideals pressedinto the minds and souls of
Germanyouth."Fritz,Frontsoldaten,
161.
26. Turner,TheRitualProcess,
103.
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defender of the Reich,27 the conclusion one might draw from the scholarship
discussed above is that combat experience either fostered or reinforced a sense
of Front- or Kampjgemeinschaft during the Second World War comparable to that
of the 1914?1918
experience, but shaped by the even more highly-charged,
circumstances
of a war of annihilation. The experience of the
extraordinary
Frontgemeinschaft was such a profound one that the individual veteran could, as
Leed has argued with respect to the World War I ex-serviceman, identify with
even continued
the "rites and symbols" of the war years as a commemoration,
celebration of liminality, without necessarily supporting National Socialist or,
later, Neo-Nazi principles.28 What follows is a discussion of veterans, groups as
an expression of whatTurner refers to as normative communitas?the creation of
a structured community through which a group that experienced a common,
transformative experience attempts "to preserve, in and by its religious and eth?
ical codes and legal and political regulations" the original experience of fraternal Gemeinschqft.29 Juxtaposed with the emergence of Kameradschaftsbiinde is an
examination of the Austrian authorities, attempts to monitor and contain them
during the 1950s?a
period during which the official Austrian state identity
based on victimization began to gain wider currency, ana in which veterans*
groups began to proliferate with the reenfranchisement
Commemoration
Second

Republic:

of Comradeship
The Occupation

of many former Nazis.
in the
Years

the years 1914 and 1945, virtually all Germans and Austrians had
themselves, or had seen a friend or relative, become a member of the imperial
armed forces, a paramilitary formation, and/or a branch of the Third Reich's
military machine. The experience of formal combat service ended when the
Between

National Socialist regime capitulated in the spring of 1945, yet the liminal char?
acter of frontline solidarity transformed itself, for some, in the politicization of
this experience after the war's end. The implications of this feeling of solidari?
ty, the result of having existed on the threshold between youth and adulthood,
life and death, one s status as a kind of crusader and one s reintegration into a
defeated and often vilified social body, had important ramifications for the sta?
bility of fledgling postwar Austrian and German societies. George L. Mosse has
27. "We were never mercenaries, but?to use the hackneyed phrase?defenders of the
Fatherland.
There arecertainlythose among our rankswho fight for the idea of NationalSocialism,
and others who fight for the fatherland,that spot on the map for which riskingone's life remains
self-evident.We lie together in the tent."This statement,authoredby the young LandserEgon
Freitagin August 1941, is a representativeexample ofthe fine line between comradeshipand the
contours of Nazi weltanschauung,and in other casesthe linkage between them. Cited in Bartov,
Hitler'sArmy,34.
28. Leed, No Man'sLand,33.
29. Turner,Dramas,Fields,andMetaphors,
169;Turner,TheRitualProcess,132.
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remarked that former soldiers of the Third Reich

frequendy found that the
[was] motivated by a feeling of solidarity moved to the
foreground [i.e.,] loyalty to individual fellow soldiers rather than to any overriding purpose."30 Among a population exhausted by war and suffering total
defeat, groups of former SS and even Wehrmacht members attempted to revive
what Mosse has designated "the Myth of the War Experience"?the
tendency
"idea of self-sacrifice

to reflect upon batde as a formative, even sanctified experience, and to influ?
ence collective memory to this end through the promotion of literary works
and popular publications, film, posters, bric-a-brac, and membership associa?
tions.31 Veterans who glorified their wartime existence through formal organi?
zation did not likely comprise an overwhelming majority of former servicemen. Nonetheless, the fact that such veterans could not find a fundamental
sense of Gemeinschaft (outside that of the Fronterlebnis) capable of transcending
what they regarded as the limiting structures of everyday civilian life once the
war ended was a cause of concern for the authorities in postwar German and
Austrian societies.
All in all, the transition from the Frontgemeinschaft, where warfare had repre?
sented the fundamental rite of passage in the National Socialist constellation of
values, to civilian life in Germany and Austria proved itself to be a rather suc?
cessful process. Paramilitary violence was never a reality after 1945; social wel?
fare benefits were extended to veterans and returning POWs to ease their tran?
sition; Red Cross, United Nations, and other international funding sources, as
well as Marshall Plan monies, helped provide the basic necessities and capital for
in Western Germany and Austria, and the occupation authorities
eflfectively monopolized the use of force. Veterans' associations, with their reverence for notions of duty and service designated as anathema after the capitulaof a marginalized
tion, however, embodied a celebration/commemoration
community that threatened both the newly-constituted legal order and, in the
Austrian case, the myth of victimization.
reconstruction

In the two Germanys the occupation authorities were naturally suspicious of
veterans' unauthorized activities, as were state and federal authorities. Circum?
stances in Austria were somewhat more complicated. The Allied Control
Commission and federal and provincial officials shared the same concerns as
their German counterparts for the democratic and antimihtaristic development
of their populations, but in Austria those in positions of responsibility, as well as
ordinary citizens, found themselves on the horns of a uniquely Austrian dilem?
ma. On the one hand, many people from across the political spectrum had
30. Mosse, FallenSoldiers,217. West Germanpopularfilm and literatureof the 1950s, Mosse
as dccentmen of honor who were not
points out,"picturedGermansoldiers,officersin particular,
to blame for the crimesof Hider or the loss of the war.Such decency,now centralto the idealof
was a counterweightto a war fought in a bad cause."
camaraderie,
31. Ibid.,7ff.
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fought in the war, and, even if not confirmed Nazis, believed that they had done
their duty. "Duty to whom?" and "Duty to what end?" are, as noted, two ques?
tions which those who would glorify the Frontkampfer experience avoided studiously.32 Rather than acknowledge that such sentiment competed with, and
endangered the credibility of, the official, carefully nurtured myth of Austria-asfirst-victim, advocates of a revived "Myth of the War Experience" attempted to
who fought in a German war of conquest and also
exonerate Austrians?those
those who supported the regime on the home front?by lumping civilians and
as victims of "bombs, misery, hunger, need, and the
soldiers together
Russians."33 On the other hand, a vocal minority, largely but not exclusively
composed of Socialists and Communists, demanded that the experiences of the
National Socialist era be rejected and the symbols and trappings of the period
be eliminated.
The first elected government of Austria's Second Republic took quick action
against the exhibition of Third Reich military symbols, working with parliament to enact legislation that oudawed the wearing of Wehrmacht uniforms,34
Wearing the uniform or insignia of any SS branch had been prohibited as a
consequence of the Provisional Government's sweeping measure oudawing the
NSDAP within Austria in early May 1945.35 The law did not stipulate, howev?
er, that prevention of public display of official Nazi-era dress would be coupled
32. "When fulfillment of duty is spoken of in connection with combat action for the NSRegime.it would be appropriateto rethinkthe notion of'duty' in this context. If insteadof'duty,'
'compulsion'were employed,then an understandingof the activitiesof GermanWehrmachtsol?
diers would be more easily possible,then the self-imposedjustificatoryideal of former soldiersof
the NS-Regime of this kind would no longer be necessaryeither."In Gartnerand Rosenberger,
94. See also HeidemarieUhl's content analysisof severalrecentarticleswritten by
Kriegerdenkmaler,
Pust lamentedthe fate of the civil pop?
IngomarPust in the CarinthianOVP's Neue Volkszeitung.
ulation in fire-bombedDresden (17 February1988) and the heroic Germanarmyat Stalingrad(30
January1988), andjustifiedbrutalaction on the partof theWehrmachtagainstthe "Tito-Partisans"
(whom he lumped togetherwith Slovenianresistancefighters)and Communistsin the Balkans(13
undVerstorung,
and 18 February1988) in Uhl, ZwischenVersbhnung
388-89.
33. , 139. Uhl sparesno criticismfor those who appropriatedthe lateAndreasHillgruber'sargu?
ment in orderto advancethatAustrians,like the Germans,had defended" VolkundVaterland"
against
Die
murder,rape, plunder,and dislocation (ibid., 138). See also Hillgruber,ZweierleiUntergang:
desDeutschenReichesund das Endedes europaischen
Judentums(Berlin,1986), as well as
Zerschlagung
Ziegler and Kanonnier-Finster.Theauthors'case studiesprovideanalysesof the self-representations
of averageAustrianswhose experiencesas soldiers,police officers,or civilianshad led them to conclude that they had been victims?consistent with the notion of the Moscow Declaration-asMagna Cartaon the one hand,or agent of memory repressionon the other.
34. OStA/AdR, BKA 40.141-2/46. Parliamentarydeputiesapprovedthe Uniform-Verbotsgesetz
on 21 December 1945, not quite one full month afterthe Second Republic'sfirstdemocraticelec?
tions;it went into efFecton 15 January1946 asBGB1.1945/12. Punishmentfor conviction carried
a fine of up to OS 2,000 or a prison stay as long as two months.The law was not enforcedconsis?
tently acrossprovincialborders,or even within the same province.
35. Gertrude Enderle-Burcel,Rudolf Jcrabck,and Leopold Kammerhofer,eds., Protokolledes
KarlRenner1945, vol. 1:29. Aprilbis KKJuli1945 (Vienna,
derProvisorischen
Kabinettsrates
Regierung
1995), 30-34.This section of the text refcrsto the discussionof StGBl. 1945/13,13 May 1945. See
81-88.
also Stiefel,Entnazifizierung,
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with forced expiation for deeds the wearer may have committed while clothed
did it stipulate that some form of civic atonement was necessary for

in it?nor

having "done one's duty" in the service of a "foreign" armed force. Problems
stemming from the literal superficiality of this legislation manifested themselves
particularly from 1949 into the early 1950s. This period marked the first of two
surges of Austrian Kameradschaftsbundformation. While veterans' associations did
exist prior to 1949, their number was negUgible and their activities understated; their gatherings were not regarded as an embarrassment by Austrian officials
authorities, for they tended to avoid celebration ofthe ideologically-charged
Frontgemeinschaft, and their members were not among those
as
Nazis
designated
according to the terms of denazification legislation ratified
the
immediate
during
postwar years.36 The number of Kameradschaftsbundeproor the occupation

liferated and the politically suspect character of their self-conception changed
after 1948, when large numbers of former Nazis judged to be less incriminated (minderbelastet, as opposed to those designated belastet) were permitted full
participation in civic life, including the right to form associations.37 In Styria,
the provincial Kameradschaftsbund association numbered 300 locally-registered
organizations with some 60,000 members in 1952.38 In the province of
Salzburg, one ofthe less densely populated Austrian Bundeslander, federal police
counted 64 registered groups with several thousand members by
1956. Their charters reveal that among them were associations dedicated to
comradeship broadly defined (i.e., nonveterans were permitted to become
members), to nurturing and sustaining friendship between veterans specifically,
authorities

and to shooting clubs.39
The stated purpose of these associations bore a striking resemblance to one
another throughout Austria; members of the Kameradschaftsbundetended to be
members of the Verband der Unabhangigen (an organization that would crystalize as the FPO by 1955/56)4() and the OVP who shared similar sentiments
with respect to their wartime experiences. The bylaws of provincial associations
were often worded vaguely, allowing politically conservative men to promote
for the Socialists and Communists (KPO) on the political
problematic?and
36. On the evolutionof this legislation,see Stiefel,Entnazifizierung,
81-88.
37. Wilhelm Svoboda, '" . . . vorbehaltlos meine Pflicht erfullt': Das Internierungslager
Glasenbach(Camp'MarcusW. Orr'),"Zeitgeschichte
22 (1995);esp.12-15. Svobodasessayexamines
the reintroductioninto civic life of formerNazis held at the Glasenbachdetentioncamp,including
the reconstitutionof the German-national/liberal
campand the commemorativeactivitiesof vet?
erans.See alsoAlbrich,"'Esgibt keinejiidischeFrage,'"155-59. Albrichpointsout thatbecausethe
WesternAllies'had insistedfirmlythatAustria'sstatusas victimbe recognizedin StateTreatynegotiations beginning in 1947, many of the Minderbelasteten
given amnesty and reintegratedinto
Austriansociety felt entitledto arguethatthey hadbeen victimizedtwice over?once by the great
"Prussianswindlc,"then by the Allies'insistencethat they be marginalizedafterthe war.An effect
of this developmentwas thatAustrianJews were denied a particularvictim statuswhen pursuing
restitutionclaims;the Austriangovernment,in the interestof "fairness"
to amnestiedformerNazis,
refusedto recognizedistinctionsamongits citizens,all of whom wereto be regardedequallyas vic?
tims of the NationalSocialistregime.AustrianJews were not permittedto pursuereparationsuntil
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of fatherland, duty, sacrifice, and remembrance.
Left, rather dangerous?notions
Camaraderie and the sustenance ofthe soldierly ideal nurtured the identities of
members of Austrian as well as German associations. Paragraph 2 ofthe uniform
statutes code for the provincial Salzburg branch of the Kameradschaftsbund, for
example, listed among its purposes and goals a number of points common to
virtually all regional associations:
? Promotion

of traditional Austrian fatherland and homeland conceptions
[Vaterlands-und Heimatsgedanken], as well as the cultivation of comradeship
among members . ..
?
Arrangement of ceremonies in memory of the dead and missing of both
[world] wars, the care of the burying places of comrades killed in action
and [otherwise] dead,
? Creation of monuments in honor ofthe dead and
missing of both wars,
?
Comradely proceedings of all kinds for the promotion of sociability . . .41
Despite the seemingly innocuous wording of these stated purposes, implicit
within them was a celebration of communitas fraught with values dangerous to
the principles upon which the Second Republic was founded. Many Austrians
who had served in the Third Reich's armed forces eagerly communed with oth?
ers who had shared the experience of warfare-as-crusade.This
had much to do
effect of conflict on the Eastern Front, but was perhaps

with the transformative

even more an expression of the often-repeated theme of struggle in Nazi ide?
ology. One need not have been a nominal or a convinced Nazi to perceive the
war as a life-and-death struggle between Germans as Europe's cultural vanguard
in the
force of barbaric "Judeo-Bolshevism"?particularly
of a racially-driven war of conquest that had become a war for survival
by the end of 1942.
Mosse's evaluation ofthe nature and perceived purpose of German veterans'
associations also holds true to a significant degree for their Austrian counterand the destructive
context

parts in the following

respect:

well afterthe StateTreatywas signed in 1955. On the notion of politics of memory and victimization in the West Germancontext,see Robert G. Moeller,"WarStories:The Searchfor a UsablePast
in the FederalRepublic of Germany,"AmericanHistorical
Review101 (1996): 1008-48.
38. Heidemarie Uhl, "The Politics of Memory:Austria'sPerceptionof the Second WorldWar
and the National SocialistPeriod,"Contemporary
AustrianStudies5 (1996):75.
39. OStA/AdR, BMLV 3.556-Pras/I/57. Sicherheitsdirektionfur das Bundesland Salzburg.
Ubersicht iiber die im Amtsbereiche der Bundespolizeidirektionund Bezirkshauptmannschaft
Salzburg-Umgebung mit dem Stande vom 1.8.1956 bestehcnden Kameradschafts-,Krieger-,
Schutzen- undVercinenahnlicherArt sowie vonVereinen,die sich mit dem Flugwesenbefassen.
40. The Vcrbandder Unabhangigen (VdU) was a curious combination of former Nazis and
Deutschnationale
types,as well as old-time Liberalswho felt they could not find a home on the right
wing of the SPO or the left wing of the OVP.
41. OStA/AdR, BMLV3.556-Pras/I/57. "Statutendes osterreichischenKameradschaftsbundes,
Landesverband Salzburg, Kameradschaft Maxglan, 27; Statuten des osterreichischen
Landesverband
Kameradschaftsbundes,
Pfarrwerfen,225.
Salzburg,Kameradschaft
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Camaraderie lost its aggressive implications?the
band of comrades against
the world?and
yet something of the older ideal remained, perhaps lying in
wait to revive the Myth of the War Experience. Close to the center of the
ideal of camaraderie had been the vision ofthe so-called new man. An effort
was made in Germany after the Second World War to save this soldierly ideal.
The most obvious attempt was the continuing glorification ofthe SS both as
new men and as paradigms of camaraderie. The veterans ofthe SS lamented,
logically enough, that the fallen had not yet received monuments of iron and
bronze, and that heroes' groves of the First World War now served merely as
picnic grounds for weary urbanites.42
A significant number of soldiers who had fought to protect Austria from
or not their under?
"bombs, rnisery, hunger, need, and the Russians"?whether
of
these
were
refracted
standing
dangers
through a Nazi prism?were dismayed,
even insulted, that federal legislation obliged the government to employ
Austrian officials and devote Austrian resources to the maintenance and securi?
ty of Allied military cemeteries and monuments. Despoiling these graves and
memorials was designated a felony and carried a maximum punishment of five
years' imprisonment.43 Austrian dead from both world wars were not neglect?
ed; yet, while legislation guaranteed public maintenance of Austrian graves and
monuments, no federal stipulations were enacted with the legislation to punish
those who might deface them.44 Although official commemoration represent?
ed a nod toward the "cult ofthe fallen soldier," for veterans who regarded their
participation in the war as a sanctified experience this official measure did not
sufficient respect for the supreme sacrifice for Vaterland and
Heimat. By way of contrast, disgrunded veterans could point to the Nazi
regime's consecration of the "highest expression of duty,"45 without bothering
to consider the contextual significance of such duty for Austrians encouraged
to disassociate themselves from volkisch connotations of Vaterland, Volk, or
demonstrate

Heimat.

42. Mosse,FallenSoldiers,
217.
und fur
43. OStA/AdR, BMI 56.779-9/1948, Bundesgesetziiberdie FiirsorgefiirKriegsgraber
Kriegcrdenkmaleraus dem 2. Weltkrieg, Referententwurf.See also BGB1. 1948/176, 670:
Bundesgesetz vom 7. Juli 1948 iiber die Fiirsorge und den Schutz der Kriegsgraberund
aus dem zweitenWeltkriegfurAngehorigeder Alliierten,VereintenNationen
Kriegerdenkmaler
und fur Opfer des Kampfesum ein freies, demokratischesOsterreichund Opfer politischer
Verfolgung.
44. BGB1. 1948/175, 669-70: Bundesgesetz vom 7. Juli 1948 uber die Furgsorge fur
Kriegsgraberaus dem ersten und zweitenWeltkrieg.On the commemorationof FirstWorldWar
veteransthrough momuments and heroes groves,see also Stefan Riesenfellner,"Todeszeichen:
ZeitgeschichtlicheDenkmalkulturam Beispiel von Kriegerdenkmalernin Graz und in der
Steiermarkvon 1867-1934,"in RiesenfellnerandUhl, Todeszeichen,
esp.17-69.
45. See Friedrich Grassegger,'"Auch Tote stehn in unsern Reihn': Nationalsozialistische
Denkmaler des Totengedenkensin der Steiermark(1938-1945)" in Riesenfellner and Uhl,
99-110.
Todeszeichen,

MATTHEW
Provocative

collaborative

PAUL

BERG

studies of Austrian memorials

529
from the two world

wars by Stefan Riesenfellner and Heidemarie Uhl and by Reinhold Gartner
and Sieglinde Rosenberger have underscored the importance of Heimat sentiments in commemorative
installations, especially in those instances where tribute was paid to the memory of Nazi era veterans. These men, "who swore an
oath of loyalty to Hider, were honored as 'Heroes ofthe Heimat.9 In no case is
the Wehrmacht remembered as a foreign military power that destroyed Austrian
sovereignty . .. It is also suppressed that this destruction of Austria was implemented with the considerable assistance of Austrians."46 One recognizes in these
commemorative
statements precisely what Leed refers to in all Europeans lands
after 1918 as "organized mourning.
. . the most acceptable way in which the
war continued to define the identities of combatants."47 Monuments
and
plaques tended to be constructed in places of special significance, in the public
squares or cemeteries of quiet little rural villages and small towns dominated by
conservative councils. There the Soldatentreffen took on the quality of a religious
to a designated site where the commemoration,
ritual, with a march/pilgrimage
or celebration,

of the sanctified Fronterlebnis occurred, the participants dressed
old Wehrmacht or SS garb, the procession
customarily?and
illegally?in
music
and singing.48 The local pastor, former unit
accompanied by patriotic
commanders, and town dignitaries would
the heroic sacrifice for home and hearth
the Frontgemeinschaft, and great ceremony
for the dead.49 Monuments
to soldiers

speak to the assembled veterans about
rendered by the living and the dead of
attended the care ofthe etemal flame
who fell in the service of the Third
Reich, Uhl notes, outnumber vasdy those to the victims of National Socialist
terror. The monuments
and graves of the latter?Jews,
concentration
camp
or
deserters
who
were either murdered or suffered inhuman treat?
inmates,
ment?tend
to be relegated to the margins of cemeteries or other inconspicuous locations.50
issues of "duty" and "service" surface here again, for the
Thorny
"Austrianness" of the living and the dead had been denied during the war?in
many instances by the soldiers themselves, definitely by the NS-Regime?in

46. Gartnerand Rosenberger,Kxiegerdenkmaler,
28-29. Uhl,"ErinnerungundVersohnung,"
147f.
47. Leed, No Man'sUnd, 212.
48. The linkage between Turner'sunderstandingof the medievalpilgrimageas traditional,reli?
as quasi-religious
gious social dramaand the personalandsocial-politicalnatureof the Soldatentreffen
social dramais compelling.SeeTurner,Dramas,Fields,andMetaphors,
175-77.
49. Gartnerand Rosenberger,Kxiegerdenkmaler,
67-84, 107, 118ff. For an examinationof ele?
ments of continuity from post-FirstWorldWar to post-1945 commemoration,see Winter, Sitesof
Memory,82-98. The impressivebreadthofWinter's study addressesthis theme in a pan-European
context.
50. Uhl, "Erinnerung und Versohnung";idem, "Erinnern und Vergessen:Denkmaler zur
Gewaltherrschaftund an die Gefallenendes
Erinnerung an die Opfer der nationalsozialistischen
zweitenWeltkriegsin Grazund in der Steiermark,"
in Riesenfellnerand Uhl, Todeszeichen,
111-95.
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favor of their inclusion into the German Volksgemeinschqft.51It should be noted,
however, that because war memorials frequendy offer the only commemorative
expression in the smaller localities where Soldatentreffen were so frequendy
staged, such monuments tend to "institute a relationship to and a presentation
of the past.. . that reduces the perception of warfare to one of normality," even
to the extent of glossing over the years 1938-45 and casting the enemy (invariably the Russians) in an unfavorable light. The end result has tended to be the
legitimization of duty-encoded memory of the war experience nurtured by
Kameradschaftsbunde members at the expense of careful reflection on either the
officially established myth of victimization or on suffering inflicted upon oth?
ers.52 As an official Kameradschaftsbundposition in one weekly newspaper stated
triumphandy in late 1952, "[While] during 1945 and thereafter the soldier was
defamed in every conceivable way .. . a healthy perspective has spread through
Austria by now."53
Far less documentation exists concerning Soldatentreffen before the conclu?
sion of the State Treaty in May 1955 than afterward. Certainly a reasonable
explanation for the existence of only a sketchy record of reunions is that they
occurred somewhat less frequendy and more surreptitiously than those
Kameradschaftsbiinde activities which took place after 1955. Because the broader
political consequence of Soldatentreffen was far riskier prior to the restoration of
full sovereignty, concerned Austrian authorities minimized their incidence and
significance, and veterans themselves very rarely chose a public forum in which
to challenge the Lebensluge. Moreover, the ever-present suspicion of manifesdy
unrepentant militaristic sentiment provided the occupying powers during the
a pretext for questioning
France and Russia?with
early 1950s?particularly
the continuation of negotiations with the Austrian government toward a treaty
and for maintaining their military presence at the expense of Austrian taxpay?
ers. Consequendy, prior to the spring of 1955, the OVP-SPO coalition viewed
Soldatentreffen and the steady appearance ofWest German Kameradschaftsverbande
publications across the Austrian border with great alarrn.The concern about the
latter was no trifling matter, for it represented a fundamental violation of the
occupiers' criteria for a democratic Austrian press. The minutes of the Executive
Council of the Allied Control Commission offer valuable insights in such
instances. The Allied authorities ordered embarrassed Austrian officials to
impose sanctions against newspapers or periodicals in Austria for violations of

51. Ernst Hanisch,"Die Prasenzdes Dritten Reiches in der Zwciten Republik,"in Kos and
Regele, Inventur45/55, 45f.
49-50.
52. Gartnerand Rosenberger,Kriegerdenkmaler,
30 November 1952. Newspaperarticlescited in
53. "Ehrenrettungdes Soldaten,"Sonntagspost,
this essaydo not include page numbers;the clipped citationswere researchedin the files of the
ArbeiterkammerfiirWien?Dokumcntation.
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the Press Decree, particularly insofar as the importation,
such literature was concerned.
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distribution, and sale of

Uniform

of such measures proved difficult at best, even
implementation
communications
Vienna and the provincial authorities were
between
though
consistent on the matter. The difficulty stemmed primarily from the fact that
the Austrian-West

German border remained too porous to control effectively
the small numbers of copies of contraband literature. This literature could then
be reproduced in Austria. In such cases the Allies justified the right to engage
in press controls in order to "assist the Austrian Government to recreate a sound
and democratic national life based on an efficient administration, stable eco?
nomic and financial conditions and respect for law and order" and to "ensure
the institution of a progressive long-term educational program designed to
eradicate all traces of Nazi ideology and to foster democratic principles among
Austrian

youth.54 Perhaps the most informative evidence regarding Austrian
Soldatentreffen comes from the West German diplomatic corps, however. West
German concerns with anti-Soviet and pro-German national sentiments with?
in segments ofthe Austrian population were relayed in May 1954 to Bruno
of the Austrian
Kreisky, then undersecretary in the Foreign Department
Chancellery. According to Kreisky s report, the German envoy Muller-Graaf
had expressed profound dismay that the frequency of Soldatentreffen involving
German and Austrian veterans and other right-wing Austrian-German cultural
initiatives, the participation of large crowds, and the "tacdessness on the part of
the German guests" streaming over the border in bus caravans, or on chartered
trains, as well as the behavior of their Austrian hosts, had elicited Soviet and
French fears of a new Anschluss?an apprehension exacerbated by measures dis?
cussed within Austria, initiated and championed chiefly by the VdU, to abolish
the visa requirement for travel between West Germany and Austria.55 Moreover,
Miiller-Graaf objected to a wealth of literature glorifying war and the Nazi era
that he had encountered at the Graz Book Fair. Kreisky noted in this connec?
tion that "[Miiller-Graaf] was compelled to tell me, unfortunately, that such a
thing would not be possible at a German fair, and that, to be sure, [in Germany]
the interest in this literature is apparendy not as great as in Austria."56
In a separate report to Chancellor Adenauer, Muller-Graaf emphasized his
concern that a growing inclination for a new Anschluss had found expression in
the non-Soviet occupied portions of Austria. This behavior manifested itself in
a number of ways: an Innsbruck hotelier's enthusiastic celebration of the
54. OStA/AdR,BKA 6.478-III/SEC/51, ControlAgreementforAustria,28 June 1946,Articles
3c) and e). See also the Executive Councils discussionover censorshipof the Deutsche-SoldatenZeitungin EXCO/P(52)41 (no minute number), 16 April 1952, and the follow-up meeting,
EXCO/P(52)41,Minute #1565,16 May 1952.
55. StBKA,VII,Staatssekretar,
Mappe"Deutschland,"1-2.
56. Ibid., 2
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German Bundestag elections by having the Deutschlandlied played, to the horror
of the assembled guests of diverse nationalities, and ex-Field Marshal
violation of an expression of strong disapproval
Kesselring's trip to Austria?in
on the part of Austria's Interior Minister, Oskar Helmer (SPO)?to
address
assembled Austrian veterans in full NS-era uniforms and decorations. MullerGraaf concluded

that the West German and Austrian gov?
a
in
crackdown against German-Austrian
agree
cooperate
of
on
both
sides
the
border.
To this end, Muller-Graaf had made
Soldatentreffen
a personal entreaty to the Bavarian minister president to police these events.57
ernments

with an exhortation
to

The anxiety expressed by the Foreign Ministry in Bonn represents an unequivocal expression of official West German antipathy toward Soldatentreffen and
Anschluss sentiment. Indeed, Muller-Graaf's alarm vis-a-vis developments
Austria reflected the West German government's concern that expressions

in
of

soldierly camaraderie and aggressive pan-German sentiment would derail the
delicate ongoing diplomatic work toward future German reunification.
Complaints raised by the Soviet occupation authorities concerning the cele?
bration of military values and the expression ofAnschluss sentiments would have
been easier for Austrian officials to shrug off if it were solely a matter of small
groups of veterans gathering in isolated locations to engage in the commemo?
ration of comradeship and sacrifice. Far more damaging to Austrian credibility
was the toleration, and in some cases outright support, extended
to
Kameradschaftsbundeby those entrusted with monitoring them: Austrian officials.
Compelled to exercise damage control, Chancellor Julius Raab (OVP) dis?
missed Soviet concerns in a speech before parliament in May 1954 with the
emphatic statement,"No one in Austria thinks of an Anschluss!"?despite Soviet
and 4ustrian communist claims that the copresence of German and Austrian
veterans represented an upsurge in potential support for a closer West GermanAustrian connection.58 Raab added, with support from the assembled SPO and
OVP representatives, that:
[S]uch a personal meeting has nothing to do with military aims.The Austrian
authorities regularly demand?and
shall continue to do so in the future?
that these meetings refrain from any and all political activities. I believe that
57. StBKA,VII,Staatssekretar,
Box-BMfAABonn, OsterreichbeziigeI,
Mappe"Deutschland:"
Mappe5,2-3. See alsoALCO/7(54)218,Minute#1868f, 14 May 1954,in which the RussianHigh
Commissioncrflichev raisedpointed objectionsagainstthe "furtherand considerablestrengthening
of fascisticand militaristictendenciesin Austria,"throughKameradschaftsbunde
led by former Nazi
as well as
gcnerals,"inuniformsofthe Hider-Wehrmachtwith decorationsand rankdesignations,"
againstthe extension of these connectionsbetween like-mindedbodies in the FederalRepublic of
Germany suid Austria.The French High CommissionerPayartexpressedsimilar concerns to
to
Miiller-Graaf,particularlywith respect to the fanfaregeneratedby the Kameradschaftsbunde
accompanythe Kesselringvisit.
58. Raab,"Erklarung
derBundesregierung,"
Sten.Prot.NR.VILG,R,39th Session,19 May 1954,
1,626.
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these soldiers' reunions will soon have run their course. In no way does the
Austrian government condone the participation of high military leaders of
Hider's army in such reunions.59
the chancellor's

denial, these meetings did, in fact, have an implicidy
political content, particularly when one considers the tone ofVdU pronouncements regarding Soldatentreffen. In an effort to explain that his party's support
for Kameradschaftsbunde and reunions was apolitical, the former Wehrmacht offi?
cer and veterans' group member Max Stendebach advocated a position that

Despite

exemplified the persistence of the very pan-German sentiments that Raab had
denied existed within Austria. According to Stendebach, the concept of the
nation-state had proven itself not viable in the twentieth century, and efforts to
use force to unite nations into states had created nothing but deplorable vio?
lence and misery. Thus, he concluded, discussion of a future Anschluss was not
on the agenda.60 Nonetheless, Stendebach added ominously that Austria and
Germany shared an incontestable, long-standing connection, expressed in the
fellowship

of participants at Soldatentreffen:

I have expressed myself plainly and clearly in favor of Austrian independence
but have also said: [with respect to] national connections,
the border
of
and
is
nonexistent
it
is
no
for
us,
Austria]
[between Germany
significance.
If we have this point of view, why should we still be induced to generate
Anschluss propaganda?61
Such statements
potentially
ture.

did litde

to reassure the Allied Control Commission
that
had been rooted out of Austrian political cul?

revanchist sentiment

59. Ibid., 1,627. The OVP parliamentarianLujo Toncic-Sorinjadded the measuredcomment
"[We must appreciatethe fact] that the soldiersof both world warswant to meet and to exchange
their sharedexperiences.There is hardlyan event that continuesto affecta man'ssoul as that of the
war- and front experience.We are, of course, entirely opposed to the misuse of these soldiers'
reunions for any other purposes.The participantsof these meetings should also ask themselves
whether, aside from their admittedlylegitimate interestsin keeping alive a sharedtradition,they
contribute something positive to the presentAustrianstate.One cannot live only in the past,and
especially former soldiers have the duty to consider whether, through these activities,they may
cause troublefor Austria."Sten.Prot.NR,VII.G.P.,39th Session,19 May 1954,1,636. For a critical
OVP perspective on Kameradschaftsbunde
and Soldatentreffen,
see also the OVP magazine Der
Aufbruch(1958/9): 28, in which the politicallymoderateauthorcriticizesthe cultivationof tradi?
tion in veterans'associations:". . . here and there stirthe spiritsof those who dwell in the past.Not
only in Germany,but in Austriatoo. Out of every corner and crack they creep forwardin many
forms and recount their old songs:of Reich, of death,of glory.Theypratdetheir half-truthsin taverns and at Kameradschaftstreffen.
They confuse heroism with megalomania,readinessto sacrifice
with heroic death on the field of their interests.They abuse,in orderto win the youth, the dead of
the last war,for their 'new concept'."Cited in Sten.Prot.NR.VIII.G.P.,69th Session,3 December
1958,3,185.
60. Stendebach,Sten.Prot.NR,VII.G.P, 39th Session,19 May 1954,1,651.
61. Ibid.
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If members of the governing Catholic conservative-social democratic coali?
tion shared Raab's optimism that the activity of Kameradschaftsbundewould soon
after
abate, a second, enthusiastic wave of Soldatentreffen and commemoration
the state treaty revealed to them their naivete. These associations had always
expressed overwhelmingjy anti-Soviet sentiments in newspaper articles or editorials, and government officials had hoped that the impetus for such a disposition would be eliminated upon withdrawal of the unwelcome Soviet military
presence.62 Rather than abate, however, the anti-Soviet tone of the veterans'
association rhetoric actually intensifted after USSR occupation forces left Austria
by the end of 1955. Members of Kameradschaftsbundefancied that their activities
had represented a kind of spiritual resistance to Soviet occupation. Thus, the
withdrawal of Soviet troops represented a moral, even quasi-military victory for
many who had fought on the eastern front between 1941 and 1945.The "offensive war in defense of Vaterlandand Heimat" carried out over ten years with the
same steadfastness as the war on the Ostfront had been waged?albeit
with very
different means?had
resulted in a delayed, yet monumental victory over bolshevism, and confirmed for conservative-minded veterans that these associations
could serve as a medium through which the exorcism ofthe red menace could
and should be celebrated.63 "Victory" over the Russians via the State Treaty in
1955 enabled Kameradschaftsbund advocates, such as the FPO parliamentary
deputy Fritz Stiiber, to draw the tenuous, provocative conclusion from a link?
age of Nazi antibolshevism with Cold War-era antipathy toward the Soviet
Union

that deeds committed during the war, and since 1945 condemned
criminal, could now be brazenly justified or relativized.

as

After, at Nuremberg and elsewhere, German execution of hostages and mea?
sures of reprisal against guerillas and partisans were declared crimes against
humanity and punished with thousands of death sentences and thousands of
years of imprisonment, after the entire German people were branded with

62. Soviet representatives
to the Allied Commissiontook extremeinterestin the censorshipof
the Austrianpress,where theirAmerican,British,and Frenchcounterparts,reluctantto introduce
controlswithout absolutecertaintythatbooks andnewspapersin questionpossessedpro-Nazi,panGermanrevanchist,militaristic,or anti-Alliedcontent,frequentlycheckedSoviet designs.See dis?
cussionof the periodicalBerichte
undInformationen
and the newspapersEchoderHeimatand Wochen
Echoin EXCO/M(51)182, Minute #2319, 2 March 1951 and EXCO/P(51)185, Minute #2354,
20 April 195 1, as well as review of von Cholitz'sSoldatunterSoldaten,EXCO/P(53)43, Minute
EineGasse,EXCO/P(53)40, Minute #2812,2
#2823,17 April 1953 and von Papcn'sDie Wahrheit:
April 1953. EchoderHeimatwas eventuallybannedunderACA orderswhen its editor crossedthe
line separating cautious apology from outright glorirkation of Nazi foreign policy. See
EXCO/P(52)50, Minute #2595,7 May 1952.
63. In this light, the selfsamecertitude of the "ultimatelyvictorious"veteransin 1955 was
expressedin the fervorofajunior Wehrmachtofficertrappedin Stalingradin late 1942:"Thiswar
compels us againto make the deepestexertionof all of our powers.. . . But still we want to hold
on becausewe know:it mustbe done for our own, for our children's,and our people'sfuture. . ."
Cited in Fritz,Frontsoldaten,
214.
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the shame of Oradour and Lidice, and very soon after the ashes of the hanged
and burned were scattered to the winds and the flesh of the executed
German officers and men has hardly decomposed, French troops are hurling
bombs and grenades into villages in Morocco against a civilian population
(admittedly a refractory one). France sat as judge at Nuremberg and there
issued its damning judgment for deeds similar to those she has now commit?
ted in North Africa, with an air of ingenuousness, as military necessity.64
At other moments, Kameradschaftsbund supporters accounted for deeds done by
Austrians and Germans in uniforms of the Third Reich with language far less
controversial and confrontational, invoking a kind of grand international and
fraternity of frontsoldiery with an almost conspiratorial wink. In
this vein, the FPO parliamentarian Heinrich Zechmann, another veterans*
advocate asserted "soldiers are always soldiers, the same thing is demanded from
soldiers every where . . ."65 Not unlike right-wing
veterans after 1918,
transhistorical

Kameradschaftsbund members projected an image of the veteran as the servant of
his national community, with an understanding of the needs of Volk and Heimat
far superior to that of leftist politicians and their ostensibly divisive class-driven
political concerns.66
Commemoration

of Comradeship

after

1955

Once the State Treaty restored Austrian sovereignty, ending the occupation
powers' authority formaUy, a second, and in many respects higher profile, wave
of Kameradschaftsbund activity surfaced. Barely a week after the treaty was signed,
Ferdinand Graf, a leading Interior Ministry official and later the Second
Republic's first defense minister, addressed a Soldatentreffen at Bad St. Leonhardt
im Lavanttal, Styria, at which members of veterans, associations appeared in old
and current Second Republic Bundesheer
imperial, First Republic,Wehrmacht,
(federal army) attire. According to Graf it was not the uniform, but the charac?
ter of the man who wore it that distinguished the soldier from the war crimi?
nal, reactionary, or fascist.67 In one particularly ostentatious, but by no means
isolated display of solidarity, a veterans' gathering of uniformed former WaffenSS men took place in Innsbruck with the apparent blessing of the OVP mayor.
The keynote

speaker was a former SS general and West German citizen. An

64. Fritz Stiiber,Sten.Prot.NR,VII.G.P.,77th Session,7 September1955,3,491. My italics.For
many of the former Nazis and SS men who had been held in what they designatedexaggeratedly
as the "concentrationcamps"of GlasenbachandWolfsberg?detention facilitiesfor war criminals,
and prominent Nazis operated by the U.S. and British occupation authorities,
Minderbelastete,
respectively,into the later 1940s?the StateTreatymay very well have been regardedas a victory
over the Anglo-Americansas well. See Svoboda," Das Internierungslager
Glasenbach."
65. Heinrich Zechmann,Sten.Prot.NR,VII.G.P.,69th Session,3 December 1958,3,183.
66. Leed, No Man'sUnd, 196.
24 May 1955. The
67. "Zwischen 'Ohne uns*und '08/15,'" Osterreichische
Neue Tageszeitung,
event occurred on May 23rd.
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address was also delivered by the regional Bundesheer commandant, who,
according to newspaper reports, praised the "comradely connection" of soldiers
of the Austrian Second Republic and former Austrian members of the
Wehrmacht "to members of the former Waffen-SS."68 Self-congratulatory
speeches emphasized "duty well done" and praised sacrifices offered bravely for
the honor and glory of Volk and Vaterland.The initially solemn commemora?
tion concluded with copious eating and spirited drinking. In yet another high?
ly publicized incident on 15 September 1958, a Soldatentreffen occurred at
border from
Hainburg an der Donau, direcdy across the Austrian-Czechoslovak
Bratislava, at which the mayor (this time a Socialist) presided over a gathering
of former Wehrmacht soldiers wearing their old uniforms and decorations.The
local Bundesheer

unit provided its band to play marching music and to accomthe
field
mass
celebrated by the parish priest.69
pany
Events of this kind violated the legislative ban on wearing Third Reich uni?
forms and emblems, and represented an embarrassing challenge to an Austrian
political culture founded on the myth of victimization and the tacit injunction
against any behavior which called the myth into question. If the actions of exsoldiers were not trouble enough for the government, a number of senior noncommissioned

and commissioned

Bundesheer

officers with World War II com?

bat experience cleariy did not take this prohibition seriously, even arriving
occasionally at Soldatentreffen in the uniforms of their First Republic or Third
Reich military service. These actions violated not only Austrian law; they also
contravened ?20 of the Bundesheer General Service Regulations Code, which
mandated that members of the Austrian armed forces wear only the military
uniform of the Second Republic. It is quite evident, though, that enforcement
of such codes proved extraordinarily difficult, particularly because local FPO,
OVP, and occasionally even SPO officials were sympathetic to the creation,
goals, and festive gatherings of Kameradschaftsbunde, in some cases they were
even enthusiastically supportive.70 Participants and patrons alike seemed unconcerned that such sentiments and activities called into question the official
Austrian rejection of National Socialism and the glorification of martial values,
and represented an affront to the high-minded principle of freedom of assem?
bly and expression when behaviors expressed antidemocratic sentiment. The
activities of Kameradschaftsbundeand the firm support lent to them by FPO lead?
ers and certain prominent conservative Catholic politicians alarmed those con-

68. OStA/AdR, BMLV44.542-Wpol/58. The Bundesheer'spoliticaldivisionrcgularlymonitoredsuch reports.The casewas reportedby both the communistVolksstimme,
23 August1958 and
the moderateSalzburger
23 August 1958.
Tageblatt,
69. OStA/AdR, BMLVPID/III/5d/58.
70. A hcartyrepectfor martialvalueswas a common sentimentamong a greatmany conserva?
tive Catholics.Partof their emotionalcompensationforAustria'sstatusas a small,dividedstatewas
the glorificationof the powerand majestyof the HabsburgEmpire,includingits militarytradition.
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cerned with a resurgent romanticization of warfare. For Communists, Social
Democrats, and progressive circles within the OVP, the values, goals, and sym?
bolic action common
to veterans' associations throughout Austria elicited
unsettling memories of fascist glorification of the military. As a countermeasure,
during the later 1950s, left wing journalists vigorously denounced reunions
involving former Waffen-SS men and Wehrmacht members, taking it upon
themselves to remain vigilant against Soldatentreffen on behalf of the republic.
The Communists, with their proud and legitimate claim as the most active
antifascist resistance group, wanted no part in these veterans' associations, and
the groups were pleased to accommodate their scruples.71 In many instances,
Kameradschaftsbunde charters included clauses which, in addition to requiring
military service in either world war, demanded that prospective members were
men who "lead an ethically irreproachable life"?a coded reference to "pious"
and conservative-minded
individuals.72 "Godless Reds," those who had
the
First
or
either
the Second World War (even though they might
opposed
have participated in them), and other somehow suspect (i.e., leftist) prospective
members would have found themselves unwelcome. The incorporation of illconcealed antileftist, antipacifist, and antirevisionist clauses in Kameradschaftsbund
statutes and the tendency for commemorative monuments to eschew reference
to those who died as a result of their opposition to the Nazi regime amounted
to a delegitimization
rejected NS-encoded

of those who questioned Frontgemeinschaft values and
notions of duty and honor.73
within
the Social Democratic
in
Opinion
camp on membership
Kameradschaftsbunde was divided. A vocal group composed largely of left-wing
party members feared the potential for veterans' associations, particularly those
organized as shooting clubs, to assume the militant antisocialist, antidemocratic
quality of Austria's interwar fascist paramilitary. This concern was underscored
when a number of associations in Tyrol and Vorarlberg sought federal authorization to carry rifles, in order that they might serve as territorial militias.74
Others within the SPO feared that the rival superpowers might capitalize on a
general resurgence of militaristic spirit to press European youth into service in
preparation

for a future

East-West

conflict.

Prior

to the creation

of the

71. On the KPO's resistanceactivity,see Radomir Luza,The Resistance
in Austria(Minneapolis,
1984), 99-155.
72. See for exampleOStA/AdR, BMLV(BKA/ALV)241.751-Pras/56. Sicherheitsdirektion
fur
das Bundesland Niederosterreich (Zl. 7.754/1 -SD), betr. Bildung von Kameradschafts-und
Schiitzenvereinen;Meldung, 25 September 1956. Statuten der HeimkehrervereinigungObritz
(BezirkHollabrunn)?3,2.
73. See againUhl, "ErinnerungalsVersohnung,"
esp. 149ff.
6 May 1959.The InteriorMinistryrefusedto sanctionthe distributionof
74. Neues Osterreich,
in turn,rejecteda suggestionthat
weaponsto privateassociations.These"localdefenseassociations,"
they be incorporatedinto the Bundesheeras as kind of reservecorps,not unlikethe NationalGuard
in the United States.
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these Social Democrats

had voiced concern that
the
backbone
for
a
Kameradschaftsbundemight provide
reactionary federal army,
it
the
as
had
with
the
1920s,
during
just
possibility that Austrian and other
Democratic
labor
Social
movements
European
might be crushed by right-wing
dominated military forces.75 The party's official position on veterans' associa?
tions was voiced by the SPO Central Secretary Otto Probst, however, who
argued that party members should seek entrance into such groups precisely
because of the possibility of lingering fascist inclinations in veterans' groups. A
social democratic presence, Probst argued, would contribute effectively to nipping these sentiments in the bud.
It is up to the party delegations in the provinces to oversee the activities of
the Osterreichische Kameradschaftsbundand to call upon their members active
therein to thwart all attempts and demonstrations that would be of a military
character and at the same time to prevent the subjection
of the
Kameradschaftsbund to the decisions of the Osterreichische Volkspartei.
Members
of the Socialist
to the
Party, insofar as they belong
Kameradschaftsbund, must make sure that the latter is not misused for political
purposes and that its members do not take part in gatherings, demonstrations,
or other events which violate the constitutional laws of our democratic
republic or which could do harm to the reputation, dignity, and honor of our
people and our state.76
Despite the party's official, rather naive belief that veterans' groups might assume
a new character through the quasi-conspiratorial activity of a very small group
of Social Democrats, the SPO was not at all prepared to discontinue its criti?
cisms of these associations. All in all, if left-wing vigilance did not always result
in the implementation of restrictions against Kameradschaftsbundeactivities, its
watchdog role helped to heighten public awareness ofthe potential danger and
very real embarrassment represented by the existence of such organizations.77
This was particularly true where Social Democratic activity was concerned;
while the Communists were tainted in the eyes of most Austrians because of
their intimate connection to the hated and feared Soviet occupation forces in

75. See FritzKonirandAnton Mayrhauser,
SPO-PTP 1953,94-95 and 97, respectively.
76. Probstconveyedthe party leaderships position,drafteda month earlier,to the assembled
conferencedelegates:Probst,PTP 1953,1lO.Thosewho sharedhis perspectivesaddedthatSocialists
had servedadmirablyas soldierssince 1934, and suggestedthatif the organizationswere politically
inoculatedthroughSPO members,such associationsmight provideusefullocationsfor the cultiva?
tion ofpro-Austriansentiment.See also the statementdeliveredby the Salzburg-Stadt
representa?
tive KurtPreussler,a decoratedSocialDemocraticveteran,SPO-PTP 1953,104f.
77. The KPO partychiefJohannKoplenigcriticizedthe tendencyof participantsat festivevet?
erans'reunions,with theirfond reminiscencesof the waryears,to representa conflictin which millions died and many more suffered as a kind of "Sozialtourismus
in field gray [feldgrau]!'
Sten.Prot.NR,VIII.G.P.,42nd Session,4 December 1957,1,735.
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Eastern Austria, Social Democrats could criticize the seemingly unrepentant
disposition of veterans' groups without being dismissed as Russian lackeys.
Feckless, apologetic statements such as Heinrich Zechmann's "soldiers will be
soldiers" had long antagonized members of the left-wing parties and progressive
Volkspartei supporters. With the end of the occupation, Social Democrats, in
particular, felt compelled to check the enthusiasm with vigilance and criticism.
SPO critics energetically pointed out the danger in linking duty?including
acts
of brutality committed under the National Socialist banner?with
the sentimental "cultivation of tradition" that Kameradschaftsbunde arrogated to them?
selves. In doing so, however, Social Democratic derogators themselves tended to
avoid championing a critical position on the vexing, unresolved question of the
individual soldier's culpability for war crimes, given, as noted, that many soldiers,
even if they had not been Nazis, had been socialized through schooling and mil?
of which may have been not
itary training to accept certain NS precepts?some
before
the
Anschluss
unlike
(e.g., virulent anticompositions supported
entirely
Rather
than
confront
this
racist
difficult element of a
munism,
anti-Semitism).
more comprehensive Vergangenheitsbewaltigung,the SPO directed its concerns to
the future, to the gradual transformation of Austria toward a social democratic
society based on principles of cooperation, solidarity, pacifism, and social justice.
which served to repress confrontation with the past in
This future-orientation,
its own right found two principle forms of expression. Many a Social
Democratic mayor or municipal official tolerated violations of the law prohibiting the wearing of Nazi symbols, if only for reasons of political expediency.
Given the large number of veterans among the Austrian electorate, first with the
enfranchisement of the Minderbelasteten in 1949, later with the return of thou?
sands of Austrian prisoners of war from Soviet detention throughout the early
and middle 1950s, SPO leaders at the local, provincial, and federal level recog?
nized the importance of winning the electoral support of veterans.78 Second, as
a party coresponsible for governing Austria, the SPO felt caught between its
conviction that the increasingly vocal presence of Kameradschaftsbunde required
firm legal countermeasures and its own reluctance to violate the taboo protecting the fragile belief in Austrian vktimization. Accordingly, Social Democratic
rhetoric vis-a-vis veterans' groups differed from the sharp, accusatory style of the
Communists, which depicted every Kameradschaftsbund member as a would-be
harbinger of a second Anschluss.79
78. See Svoboda,"DasInternierungslager
Glasenbach,"12-16.
editorialsand the statementsof Communistpoliticianswere couched routinely
79. Volksstimme
in accusatoryfashion,often expressedas rhetoricalquestions:"The Landserwho had spent so many
years with each other and had lain in the mud together would like to see one another again,
exchange their memories and what has become of their'buddies.'Yetwhy arethese massmeetings
necessaryif they want to see friends again?A privatereunion gives, indeed, far more opportunity
almost alwaysbecome political demon?
to exchange memories.And why do Kameradschqftstreffen
10 August 1958.
und Hakenkreuz,"Osterreichische
strations?"
Volksstimme,
"Biertisch,Westerwald,
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Throughout the 1950s SPO critics of veterans' groups focused on the violation of legal ordinances against wearing Third Reich uniforms and emblems so
at veterans' gatherings and against the politicized
common
activity of
Bundesheer personnel at rallies and reunions. By the end of the decade, persistent criticism from the political left appears to have succeeded in propelling the
OVP-dominated
chancellery toward demonstrating an interest in enforcing the
law against the wearing ofWehrmacht or SS uniforms, as well as preventing the
attendance of uniformed Bundesheer servicemen at reunions.80 The tendency
for many of the veterans present at such gatherings and commemorations to
wear World War II decorations complete with swastika recalled unsavory polit?
ical sentiments, and the Socialists, increasingly concerned with issues of federfor chil?
ally-managed staatsburgerlicheErziehung (civics education)?especially
out
dren, in the interest of a genuinely democratic future civic culture?pointed
that this form of expression, itself implicidy political, presented to members of
the younger generation an ambiguous message regarding the Nazi period.81
Gradually, OVP officials in the chancellery came to see Kameradschaftsbundeand
their activities as symbolic expressions of not merely confused, but more importandy volatile political sentiments. This recognition resulted in overwhelming
parliamentary support for legislation in 1960 that forbade "wearing or other?
wise displaying the symbols of organizations forbidden in Austria,"82 but did not
prohibit veterans from wearing World War II decorations
swastika?an incomplete victory at best for resistance fighters,
victims of National Socialist policy, and left-wing politicians
for it did not censure those who endorsed or participated in

not bearing the
racial or political
and pedagogues,
Nazi militarism.

80. Bundesheersoldierswho participatedin reunions,marches,or demonstrationsdid not ini?
2 and4 of the Wehrgesetz,
which grantedsoldiers
tiallyor consistendycomply with ?36 paragraphs
the full rightsof nonuniformedcitizens,but preventedthem fromparticipatingin politicalactivity
in uniform. See OStA/AdR, BMLV 234.843-I/Pras/56,Vereine zur Pflege der militarischen
27 August 1956.
Kameradschaft;
Mitghedschaftund Tragen der Uniform bei Veranstaltungen,
Chancelloryofficialsexpressedgreaterconcern that the Austriansoldiersmight be broughtinto
closercontactwith "WestGermaninstitutions,"
forbiddenunder?4 of the StateTreaty.Raab'sstaff
seemed to indicatetherebythatthey were farless concernedwith the enthusiasmfor Soldatentreffen
emanatingfromAustrians,and focusedinsteadon the internationallegal ramificationsof connec?
tions between veteranson both sidesof the border;to directattentionto the formerissueswould
havebeen to admitthat certainresidualpan-German,if not necessarilyNazi sentimentpersistedin
the Second Republic,in contradictionto his assertionthat no affinityfor closerconnection with
Germanyexisted in Austria.See OStA/AdR, BMLV 501.098-RB/55. BKA/ALV an das BMIGDOS, 20 September1955.
81. The OVP representative
Alfons Gorbachexpressedthe opinion that becauseAustrianshad
alwaysbeen valiantsoldiers,they shouldbe allowedto wearmedalswon duringthe SecondWorld
War,and if these decorationsbore the swastikathis was no longer a living symbol,but a reminder.
He was not at all clear,however,as to what sort of reminderthis would be, and did not recognize
the inconsistencyin wearingmedalsas a grim keepsaketo celebratethe glory of fallen soldiers.
Stcn.Prot.NR,VIII.G.P.,15th Session,6 December 1956, 512-23. This contradictionwas pointed
out by the SPO s MarieEmhart,ibid.,527-28.
82. BGBI. 1960/84,611.
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Furthermore, the senior governing party remained divided over the significance
of veterans' associations; indeed, the OVP Minister of Defense Graf, a former
Third Reich military officer himself, denied consistendy that the presence of
federal troops as official honor guards at war monuments, soldiers' graves, or sol?
statutes. On the other hand, Soldatentreffen
critics
whenever individuals?espe?
contended,
politicized, left-wing
such
as
Graf?blindly
cially prominent personalities
praised a tradition associated with oppressive regimes.83 Communists and Social Democrats, despite their
bitter and fundamental programmatic differences, remained rather united in
diers' cemeteries

violated Bundesheer

became

their rejection of both the conservative, Catholic character ofthe old monarchy
and the militant nationalism and violent racial intolerance
of National
Socialism.
Conclusion:

the Politics
of Identity
Revisiting
in Austrian
Political
Culture

This essay has explored how veterans sought to reestablish an exclusive form of
community on the basis of their shared frontline experience during the 1950s,
conflicting reaction on the part of Austrian
with preventing unrepentant veterans' groups from contradicting the myth of victimization upon which the Second Republic was
founded.84 The goal of veterans' associations was to nurture the collective iden?
tity of those who had shared a transformative experience?not
solely, or even
and examined
authorities

the sometimes

concerned

primarily political lobbying for the establishment and maintenance of war-related disability or service pensions.85 Kameradschaftsbunde may not have been sig?
nificant in terms of the size of the population they represented. Nonetheless,
they offered a certain highly structured revivification of the existential bond
of the connection between the living
between survivors, and commemoration
and the dead for those Austrians who relished camaraderie, sought to deny cul83. See for example the complaintforwardedto Raab by SPO deputiesRudolf Singer,Rudolf
Appel, and Kurt Preusslerregardingthe presenceof high-ranking,uniformedBundesheerofficers
in St. Polten,
at a festivalhonoring the Austriandead of both world warsat the Prandtauer-Kirche
LowerAustriaon 12 May 1957.TwouniformedBundesheersoldiersalsoservedas the honor guard.
25 May 1957.
OStA/AR, BMLV26.547-Wpol/57,23 May 1957,3-4, as well Die Arbeiter-Zeitung,
For Minister Grafs devensiveresponse,see OStA/AdR-BMLV 26.547-Wpol/57, 24 May 1957,
5-6, as well as the following reportsin OVP newspapers:"Eine uberflussigeSPO-Anfrage.Keine
Parteipolitik im Bundesheer," Kleines Volksblatt,26 May 1957; "Heldenehrung ist keine
27 May 1957.
Parteipolitik,"Unzer Volksblatt,
84. VictorTurnerremindsus that such examplesof normative
communitas
areformed"underthe
influence of time, the need to mobilize and organizeresourcesto keep the members of a group
alive and thriving,and the necessityof social control among those membersin pursuanceof these
169.
and other collective goals .. "Turner,Dramas,Fields,andMetaphors,
85. Associationsrepresentingthe interestsof Austrianveteranswho returnedhome between the
in
late 1940s and 1955 from Soviet POW campsshould not be confusedwith Kameradschaftsbunde
this respect,although Heimkehrer
representationin veterans'associationswas not entirelyunusual.
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pability for war crimes, and resented the perceived humiliation of postwar occu?
pation. While politicized right-wing Austrian and German Second World War
veterans did not, as onetime, self-proclaimed neue Menschen, seek to destabilize
their counterparts a gen?
society through acts of antisystemic violence?unlike
eration earlier?the dislocation of their particular liminal experience imprinted
itself deeply upon their postwar lives:
The soldier was a man who had lived for a seemingly endless period of time
beyond civilian social categories, beyond any but purely formal and mechan?
ical class distinctions. The experience of living outside of class, but in ranks,
as socially declassified or not yet classified individuals, was productive of an
undeniable sense of comradeship among those who shared this situation. But
it was also productive of an inability to link up the social experience of war
with the social problems and political issues of postwar society.86
military defeat and the Western Allies' decision to reconstruct
German-speaking Central Europe after 1945, rather than to seek retribution as
in 1918/19, preempted the kind of crisis resulting from the inability to reintegrate veterans that had plagued both German and Austrian societies during the
Irrefutable

interwar years. Western initiatives were influenced, of course, by perceptions of
Cold War geopolitical exigencies, and facilitated by the integration of Western
Germany and Austria, formally or de facto, into the Western community
through generous Marshall Plan support.87
For Kameradschaftsbund members, however, the inability or unwillingness to
acknowledge the highly-charged political symbolism of Soldatentreffen and to
comprehend their wider social and political ramifications were reinforced by
Western material assistance and the Westem-sponsored myth of Austrian vic?
veterans could explain away the exceptional scale of
Right-wing
on the eastern front, nourished by an atmosphere of unprecedented
intolerant, racist nationalism, with language that resonated with elements of
timization.

violence

Nazi weltanschauung. The juxtaposition of Austrian particularism, expressed
through the notion of victimization and internalization of the conviction that
the Austrians, as a distinct part ofa larger German Volksgemeinschaft,ss had sacrificed themselves for the preservation of the Western cultural inheritance
against the hitherto "most sinister of Asiatic onslaughts" drew back the curtain
somewhat, revealing the fragility of the hebensluge. Insofar as organized, rightwing veterans persevered in their stubborn interpretation of the Cold War as a
86. Leed, No Man'sLand,200.
87. See, for example, Giinter Bischof, "'Austria looks to the West': Kommunistische
undWcstorientierungamAnfangder funfzigerJahre"in
Putschgefahr,
geheimeWiederbewaffhung
Osterekhin denFunfzigern,
ed.ThomasAlbrich,KlausEisterer,MichaelGehler,and Rolf Steininger
(Innsbruck,1995), 183-209.
88. See the Herr Lang case study in Ziegler and Kannonicr-Finster,Osterreichs
Gedachtnis,
173-92.
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continuation

of the "noble struggle" against Bolshevism, however, the sanctity
of the Frontkampfer experience was preserved.89 Two sets of factors are impor?
tant in this context. First, for Kameradschaftsbundlerthe reenfranchisement of the
Minderbelasteten in 1948/49, the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Austria in
1955, and the general amnesty for all Ehemaligen (former) National Socialists in
1961 represented decisive victories in an ultimately successful crusade. Second,
the Moscow Declaration's pronouncement on Austrian victimization created an
official, public memory of the wartime experience, which produced and perpetuated the private memory of individuals who could reflect upon their indi?
vidual experience as one of victimization.
As the testimonial of representative Austrian veterans in the work of Meinrad
attests (representative of all postwar
Ziegler and Waltraud Kannonier-Finster
political camps, and with divergent attitudes toward the Nazi regime prior to
1938), some Austrians were quite capable of reconstructing their individual
as Opfer, despite having participated in the war, and even having
supported the Nazi regime. A great number had hoped for economic rejuvenaexperiences

tion from the Anschluss in 1938, yet were disillusioned by the devastation and
privation the war visited upon them; others felt victimized by a Nazi regime
which, they contended, had betrayed the ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft it had
promised by treating Austrians as second-class Germans. Others felt a certain
compulsion to support the regime out of fear of the consequences. For some
soldiers, victimization assumed the form of the execution of their professional
duties in the face of real or imagined snubs or ridicule from their "Prussian"
for others, victimization entailed detention in prisoner of
comrades-in-arms;
on
war camps.
The volatile elements of the Austrian past, manifested in the embarrassment
veterans' groups posed to the government, have been repressed, but clearly not
fallout from Kurt Waldheim's presidential election and Jorg
Haider's guest appearances at Soldatentreffen suggests in no uncertain terms that
the curious phenom?
the "grammar" of Austrian political culture?particularly
enon of an untruth concerning victimization (or at best, a partial truth) serving
to the present, not pre?
as the "Magna Carta" of the Second Republic?have,
served foundational taboos from violation. It suggests that a substantial and vocal
resolved. The

minority of young and old alike is unwilling to sustain the delicate psychic balance upon which the Lebensluge rests, and has been prepared to seek alternatives
or Catholic conservative visions of the future under
to Social Democratic
recent post-Cold War conditions of instability and uncertainty. As the last of the
Kameradschaftsbundler pass away, the challenge that these new right-wing critics
represent to the Second Republic's dominant political discourse reflects the lack
115.
89. Gartnerand Rosenberger,Kriegerdenkmater,
87ff.
90. Ziegler and Kannonier-Finster,Osterreichs
Geddchtnis,
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of resolution in conflicting notions of PftkhterfiiUung vs. victimization in
Austrian public and private memory, and the ambiguousness of Austria's rela?
tionship to Germany throughout the twentieth century.91
John Carroll University

91. Iwo examplesillustratethis point. First,in reactionto the increasedpresenceof "undesirable"foreignersfrom the easternMediterraneanand southernor easternEuropein Austriain the
1980s and early 1990s takingjobs and puttingAustriansout of work, Haiderpresenteda speech
and"efficiency"ofNazi Beschtftigungspolitik.
His commentswere received
praisingthe "orderiiness"
and consternationit provoked
enthusiasticallyby most FPO supporters,but the embarrassment
promptedHaiderto step down fromhis positionas provincialgovernorof Carinthiain June 1991,
aftera tenureof little more than two years.The foreignpresencein Austriais less than 10 percent
ofthe total population,and their employmentis overwhelminglyin tasksand physicallaborhigh?
ly undesirableto most Austriancitizens.The second examplepertainsto the discoveryof skeletal
remainsdated,initially,from the earry-mid1940s at a constructionsite in Lambach,UpperAustria
in lateJanuary19%.The find promptedthe followingremarksfromsome ofthe town'sresidents:
"Whereare the Jews in there,then?";"Isit known for certainthat those areJews?Or arethey our
Germansoldiers?"Cited in "LambacherSkelettrunde:
'Sanseh unseredeutschenSoldaten'?"Profil
6 (3 February19%):23.

